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Waiting for Gundy
How much authority—how much room to make policy choices—can
Congress delegate to the president and executive branch? This was the
question at the heart of Gundy v. United States, a case heard by the
Supreme Court this past term. On its face, the case was about sex
offender registration. In setting the registration rules going forward,
Congress left it to the attorney general to decide the complicated
question of how those rules should apply to those previously convicted,
perhaps even to those who already served their sentences. After the
attorney general decided to apply the registration rules across the board,
a previously convicted sex offender, Herman Gundy, failed to register,
and was then convicted of violating the statute, and sentenced. The
question specifically before the Court was whether Congress had
unconstitutionally delegated too much discretion, too much of its
legislative power, to the attorney general.
But for the Court and its close observers, the issue was much broader.
Since the 1930s, no statute has been held to unconstitutionally delegate

too much of Congress’ power. The Court has consistently held that as
long as Congress includes an “intelligible principle” in a statute, meaning
some guidance from Congress on how it wants the executive branch to
apply the discretion it’s delegating, the delegation is valid. On that basis,
Congress has delegated vast authority to the president, and the
administrative agencies he or she oversees, to issue rules designed to
protect our air and water from toxic emissions, to guarantee product
safety, to set labor standards, to decide what drugs are safe for use, to
monitor food safety, and much, much more. The entire modern
regulatory state is built on these congressional delegations to expert
executive branch bodies to make rules governing an increasingly
complex world.
Then, Gundy threw all of that into question. A decision that found
Congress had delegated too much authority would impact, and likely
threaten, a vast, unpredictable range of rules on subjects as varied as
drug safety and highway regulation, health codes and environmental
regulations. With a new line-up of justices on the Court (not including
Justice Kavanaugh, who was not confirmed until after oral argument in
Gundy), supporters of the regulatory state watched in trepidation; while
opponents watched with hope.
But, another more specific group was also watching Gundy with
anticipation. Among the vast array of congressional delegations to the
executive branch is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a
statute granting the president authority to issue tariffs on imports he or
she finds threaten national security. It was under that statute that
President Donald Trump had issued controversial high tariffs on

aluminum and steel imports from a range of countries, including allies
like Canada. Challenging those tariffs, lawyers representing the
American Institute for International Steel argued that the delegation in
section 232 was unconstitutionally broad. If threats to national security
could include steel and aluminum imports from allies, the concept has
no rational bounds, they argued. A lower court found against the
plaintiffs on the basis of precedent, but expressed sympathy for their
position. The case was awaiting a decision on certiorari as the decision
in Gundy was being announced.
Those worried about the national security tariffs were thus
watching Gundy for hints about how to challenge those trade
delegations. And many weren’t just worried about section 232. Over the
years, Congress has delegated vast authority to the president when he or
she identifies a threat to national security or declares a national
emergency. Different statutes, using different language, authorize the
president to raise tariffs; to sanction states, institutions, and individuals;
to redirect funds to projects Congress has not authorized; to deny certain
individuals or groups entry into the United States; and to use military
force.
In the past two years alone, Trump has claimed such authority to
unilaterally issue steel and aluminum tariffs under Section 232 and
threaten the same on auto parts; to implement a travel ban targeting
majority-Muslim countries under the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (INA); to threaten Mexico with tariffs under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) if it didn’t do more to stop
migration to the U.S.; to find funds for a border wall that Congress

specifically chose not to support; to continue attacks under the 2001
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF), originally passed to go
after the perpetrators of 9/11, on militant groups in Syria and elsewhere;
and to float the possibility under the same AUMF of war with Iran (an
interpretation the State Department seems to have thankfully mostly
dropped) .
For many watching these developments, these congressional delegations,
justified on national security grounds, seemed like a blank check. To
address these concerns, this group would love to see national security
delegations rolled-back or disciplined, and a revitalized non-delegation
doctrine, which would limit the discretion Congress could delegate,
would certainly help. Gundy, thus, set those favoring a regulatory state
and those worried about a national security one on a collision course. A
win for environmental regulation would be a loss for constraining
emergency powers and vice versa.
Heads I Win; Tails You Lose
But if that trade-off seems strange or unfair, the reality of Gundy was
worse—both could lose! The majority in Gundy — in a decision written
by Justice Kagan, and joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor — delivered a seeming win for the regulatory state. Reading
the statute narrowly, they concluded that the delegation contained an
“intelligible principle,” and following the Court’s precedent, upheld the
statute and Gundy’s conviction. Begrudgingly joining the majority was
Justice Alito, who explained that he was only joining because there was
no majority in favor of reconsidering the Court’s permissive precedent.

The opinion Justice Alito presumably would have joined was the dissent
authored by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas. The dissenters, if there had been more of them, would
have resurrected the non-delegation doctrine and found the delegation
to the attorney general in Gundy unconstitutional. In so doing, they
would have allowed delegations in three narrower circumstances: (1) to
merely “fill-up the details” of a statute, (2) where the statute delegated
only a finding-of-fact on which action under the statute might turn, and
(3) in areas where congressional powers overlapped with those of the
president, most notably on issues of foreign affairs and national security.
In other words, if the dissenters had their way—which, with Justices
Kavanaugh and Alito’s votes they might have—much of the
administrative state could be declared unconstitutional and dismantled,
while the expansive delegations to the president on national security
would remain untouched.
As expected, those who support the work of administrative agencies, like
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), were relieved by the majority’s opinion, but
anxious at the possibility of a future majority in favor of the
dissent. Supporters of the tariff case, and the potential it held for
constraining national security delegations, were disappointed, a sense
confirmed when certiorari before judgment was denied four days later.
No Way Out
The two main Gundy opinions thus highlight the imbalanced stakes of
current constitutional non-delegation doctrine. Those worried about

unchecked presidential authority over national security can’t argue
against the breadth of congressional delegations without threatening the
entire administrative state. “National security” or “emergency” or
“threat” may be very broad principles to work with, but they aren’t
obviously any broader than terms like “fair” or “reasonable” used in
other statutes. But taking that risk hardly promises success. While those
worried about executive national security authority can’t argue that
national security delegations are more constitutionally suspect than
others; those supporting national security delegations (or opposing the
regulatory state) can argue that are they less.
The only existing constitutional principle to distinguish between national
security and other delegations works only to strengthen the standing of
the former. The principle, that foreign affairs and national security are
different, was most famously articulated in United States v. CurtissWright, a decision cited by the dissenters in Gundy and which was
notably decided by the same justices who invalidated New Deal
legislation on non-delegation grounds—the last justices to do so. Support
on the Court for a strong non-delegation doctrine has long been
connected with support for a powerful national security president.
There was a time, not that long ago, when it looked like the Court might
be moving away from that dynamic. In contexts other than delegation,
various justices across the ideological spectrum had
expressed skepticism of executive branch claims to special foreign affairs
or national security deference. Chief Justice Roberts, for example,
rejected the president’s claims to special authority in Medellín (to order
Texas to comply with an international judgment) and Bond (to interpret

the Chemical Weapons Convention) and would have rejected the
president’s claims to exclusive authority to issue statements about
Jerusalem’s status in Zivotofsky v. Kerry. Given these signals, some
wondered if Curtiss-Wright was still good law or still had any force.
But the Gundy opinions suggest that an old equilibrium has returned.
The more conservative justices, aligned with the dissent, favor
disciplining the administrative state but not the national security
president. Just last term, writing for a conservative majority to uphold
the travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts, wrote that the
“comprehensive” delegations to the president in the INA to exclude
aliens “exuded deference.” This term, Roberts joined the Gundy dissent,
along with other justices in the Trump v. Hawaii majority.
Facing them on the other side of the Court are justices who *might* be
more concerned about the dangers of unchecked presidential national
security powers. Their prior decisions, upholding deference in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry, for example, suggest that concern is far from categorical and
that they too may be prone to blink when national security might be on
the line. What seems much more categorical is their faith in the
administrative state and defense of the intelligible principle doctrine.
Some might argue that worrying about some delegations while favoring
others is exactly as it should be. You take the good with the bad.
Recognizing that delegation grants the president authority you want him
or her to have and authority you’d rather he or she didn’t, might act as a
discipline, tempering enthusiasm for the administrative state and
preaching congressional restraint. But it doesn’t. Expansive delegations

on all subjects are the norm. And to the extent it does give some pause to
those who favor the regulatory state but worry about national security
discretion, it worries only them. Their mirror image, those who favor
broad executive discretion on national security issues but despise the
administrative state, aren’t forced to accept any trade-offs. They can have
their cake and eat it too. Existing doctrine gives them a ready-made way
to distinguish national security delegations from other questions, but
one that only works in their favor.
Cutting the Gundy-ian Knot
So where does that leave those who are concerned about undisciplined
presidential actions in the name of national security or emergencies? Is
an unwanted trade war with Canada, Japan, and the European Union,
simply the cost of safe drugs? Congress seems the obvious route to avoid
that trade-off. These are delegations; Congress could take the powers
back. Putting aside the fact that after Zivotofsky v. Kerry, some justices
might allow broad executive discretion even in the absence of any
statutory authority (or contrary to statutory discipline), any
congressional attempt to wrest these powers back would likely need to
overcome a presidential veto, and thus require a congressional
supermajority. Expecting Congress to muster that on questions of
foreign policy that members might prefer not to own, seems vaguely
delusional. Or to put it another way, imagine what a president would
need to do in order to muster such a supermajority against him or her.
Whatever you’re now picturing, I imagine you’d rather not wait to see it
happen.

So while lobbying Congress seems imperative, a path through the courts
cannot simply be renounced. The focus might turn, as it already has, to
the specifics of particular cases, arguing not against the underlying
delegation but its use. In any given case, those concerned might argue
that terms like national security or emergency have been abused. They
might point to the process behind the action and argue bad faith. They
might propose a narrower reading of the statute (with a whiff of
constitutional avoidance) that the president’s actions fail. Each claim
would face an uphill battle, but would at least hold out hope that a
majority of justices, liberated from focusing on the broader delegation
question, might coalesce. Alternatively, those concerned might try to
minimize the national security or foreign affairs aspects of a statute,
arguing that whatever the statute’s language, the powers it invoked are
really Congress’s alone. Or as Just Security’s Kristen Eichensehr has
argued, it might mean providing less deference to the president under a
version of the Youngstown analysis when a majority of Congress has
voted their disapproval.
But the holy grail for those concerned about unbridled presidential
national security, foreign relations, or emergency powers remains a
principle that can explain why delegations in those categories are MORE
concerning than ordinary domestic ones. Some arguments are out there:
One might argue, for example, that national security, foreign relations,
and emergency delegations are different because they tend to externalize
their costs onto non-citizens who cannot fully access the American
political process. But that argument is more attractive to scholars than
courts, and anyway, is met by the doctrinal counterargument that the
president is the constitutional actor best situated to assess foreign

opinions. In general, a principle likely to convince the Court remains
elusive. Ironically though, Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent might
suggest an avenue worth exploring.
Fact-finding Fallacies
Justice Gorsuch’s second category of acceptable delegations are those
that involve merely presidential fact-finding. At first glance, this second
category seems designed to protect foreign affairs and national security
delegations as much as the third. Many such delegations are structured
exactly that way. They allow the president to take certain actions after a
finding of a threat to national security or emergency. But thinking more
deeply about the fit reveals a problem with such delegations: they are
fact-finding in name only.
“National security,” “emergency,” and other similar triggers pretend to
be factual scenarios that can be ascertained when they are, in fact,
nothing of the sort. Such terms lack any stable meaning; fact-finding is
illusory, because there is no established baseline. Such terms are not
even normative judgments like “fair” or “reasonable.” Instead, they are
merely empty labels to be filled, like the definitions section of a contract.
To put it another way, fact-finding doesn’t find a national security issue,
it constructs one. It is basically the delegation of story-telling. The factfinding doesn’t discipline the delegation, but instead creates and enables
it.
While this realization may not be a test for unconstitutional delegations,
it might point in the direction of one, explaining what instinctively might

worry many about the nature of delegations used to unilaterally fund
projects, exclude aliens, start trade wars, or designate enemies. It might
also provide guidance for future delegations, suggesting more concrete
factual scenarios that might serve as triggers of presidential power. What
is clear though is that until a test or principle is found, the national
security delegation conundrum will remain.

